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This paper studies the impact of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion on equilibrium asset
prices and portfolio holdings in competitive nancial markets. It argues that attitudes to-
ward ambiguity are heterogeneous across the population, just as attitudes toward risk are
heterogeneous across the population, but that heterogeneity of attitudes toward ambiguity
has dierent implications than heterogeneity of attitudes toward risk. In particular, when
some state probabilities are not known, agents who are suciently ambiguity averse nd
open sets of prices for which they refuse to hold an ambiguous portfolio. This suggests a
dierent cross-section of portfolio choices, a wider range of state price/probability ratios
and dierent rankings of state price/probability ratios than would be predicted if state
probabilities were known. Experiments conrm all of these suggestions. Our ndings con-
tradict the claim that investors who have cognitive biases do not aect prices because they
are infra-marginal: ambiguity averse investors have an indirect eect on prices because they
change the per-capita amount of risk that is to be shared among the marginal investors. Our
experimental data also suggest a positive correlation between risk aversion and ambiguity
aversion that might explain the \value eect" in historical data.
JEL Classication: C91, D53, D81, G11, G12
Keywords: Ambiguity, Experiments, Financial Markets, Heterogeneity1 Introduction
The most familiar model of choice under uncertainty follows Savage (1954) in
positing that agents maximize expected utility according to subjective priors.
However, Knight (1939), Ellsberg (1961) and others argue that agents dis-
tinguish between risk (known probabilities) and ambiguity (unknown proba-
bilities), and may display aversion to ambiguity, just as they display aversion
to risk.1 The nancial literature, while admitting the possibility that some
individuals might be averse to ambiguity, has largely ignored the implications
for nancial markets.2
In this paper, we use theory and experiment to study the eect of atti-
tudes toward ambiguity on portfolio choices and asset prices in competitive
nancial markets. Our point of departure is the (theoretical) observation that
aversion to ambiguity has dierent implications for choices | and hence, dif-
ferent implications for prices | than aversion to risk. Agents who are merely
averse to risk will choose to hold a riskless portfolio (that is, a portfolio that
yields identical wealth across all states) only if price ratios are exactly equal
to ratios of expected payos, which is a knife-edge condition. However, agents
who are averse to ambiguity will choose to hold an unambiguous portfolio
(that is, a portfolio that yields identical wealth across states whose probabil-
ities are not known) for an open set of prices and probabilities. If aversion
to ambiguity is heterogeneous across the population and aggregate wealth
diers across ambiguous states (states whose probability is not known), this
generates a bi-modal distribution, with the most ambiguity averse agents
holding equal wealth in ambiguous states and the other agents holding the
net aggregate wealth. As a result, state price/probability ratios (ratios of
state prices to probabilities) may be quite dierent than they would be if all
agents maximized expected utility with respect to a common prior, even to
the extent that pricing may be inconsistent with the preferences of a repre-
1Knight used the terms risk and uncertainty; we use risk and ambiguity because they
seem less likely to lead to confusion.
2Exceptions include Epstein & Wang (1994) and Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent & Williams
(2002).sentative agent who maximizes state-independent utility with respect to such
prior.
Our experimental ndings conrm the predictions of this theoretical anal-
ysis. We nd that a signicant fraction of agents are suciently ambiguity
averse that they refuse to hold an ambiguous portfolio, that the degree of
ambiguity aversion is heterogeneous across the population, and that rank-
ings of state price/probability ratios can be anomalous, and are anomalous
exactly in those congurations when theory suggests they are most likely to
be.
The environment we study is inspired by Ellsberg (1961). Uncertainty in
Ellsberg's environment is identied with the draw of a single ball from an urn
that contains a known number of balls, of which one third are known to be
red and the remainder are blue or green, in unknown proportions. Ellsberg
asked subjects rst, whether they would prefer to bet on the draw of a red
ball or of a blue ball, or on the draw of a red ball or a green ball, and second,
whether they would prefer to bet on the draw of a red or green ball, or of a
blue or green ball. Ellsberg found (and later experimenters have conrmed)
that many subjects prefer \red" in each of the the former choices and \blue or
green" in the latter. Such behavior is \paradoxical" | that is, inconsistent
with maximizing expected utility with respect to any subjective prior. (Such
behavior violates the Savage (1954) independence axiom.)
We embed this environment in an asset market in which Arrow securities
(assets) are traded. Each security pays a xed amount according to the color
of the ball drawn from an Ellsberg urn. The Red security (i.e., the security
that pays when a red ball is drawn) is risky (the distribution of its payos
is known) while the Blue and Green securities are ambiguous (the distribu-
tion of their payos is unknown). In order to study the eects of ambiguity
aversion, we exploit the freedom of the laboratory setting to augment the
environment in three ways: rst, by determining aggregate supplies of the
various securities we manipulate aggregate wealth in the various states; sec-
ond, by determining the number of balls of each color and by drawing balls
without replacement, we manipulate true probabilities; third, by replicating
2sessions, we construct environments which are parallel in every dimension
except that in one environment the true composition of the urn is known and
in the other environment it is unknown.3;4
To model preferences that display ambiguity aversion, we use the multi-
ple prior \-maxmin" model of Ghirardato, Maccheroni & Marinacci (2004),
which is a generalization of the \maxmin" model of Gilboa & Schmeidler
(1989). This specication provides a natural way to broaden the spectrum
of agents' behavioral traits without a radical departure from the familiar ex-
pected utility model and with little loss in terms of tractability. For these
preferences and experimental environment, the parameter  corresponds to
the degree of ambiguity aversion:  = 1 corresponds to extreme ambiguity
aversion,  = 1=2 corresponds to ambiguity neutrality, and  = 0 corre-
sponds to extreme ambiguity love.
Ambiguity aversion ( > 1=2) has implications for individual choice be-
havior: there is an open set of prices with the property that an ambiguity
averse agent who faces these prices will choose to hold an unambiguous port-
folio (in our setting, a portfolio yielding equal wealth in the Green and Blue
states). Indeed, an agent who is maximally ambiguity averse ( = 1) will
always choose to hold an unambiguous portfolio, no matter the relative prices
of the ambiguous securities. By contrast, an agent who maximizes expected
utility with respect to a subjective prior will choose to hold equal quantities
of two securities only if the ratio of prices is equal to the ratio of subjective
probabilities.
3The behavior seen in Ellsberg's paradox might suggest that the price of the Red
security should be higher than the price of the Blue security and of the Green security,
and that the price of the portfolio consisting of one Blue and one Green security should
be higher than the price of the portfolio consisting of one Red and one Blue security.
However, such prices could not obtain at a market equilibrium because they admit an
arbitrage opportunity.
4Epstein & Miao (2003) studies an environment in which agents are equally ambiguity
averse but have dierent information, and hence do not agree on which states are ambigu-
ous. In our environment, agents agree on which states are ambiguous but exhibit diering
levels of ambiguity aversion.
3If supplies of ambiguous securities (Blue and Green, in our case) are
unequal and the degree of ambiguity aversion is heterogeneous across the
population, this choice behavior has an immediate implication for the cross-
section of equilibrium portfolio holdings. Because suciently ambiguity
averse agents will choose to hold an unambiguous portfolio, the remaining
| less ambiguity averse | agents must hold the imbalance of ambiguous
securities. Thus, the cross-section of portfolio holdings should have a dier-
ent mode and higher variation when there are ambiguity averse agents than
when all agents maximize expected utility.
In the same context, this choice behavior also has a more subtle impli-
cation for equilibrium pricing. If all agents maximize expected utility with
respect to a common prior (but with possibly dierent risk attitudes), equi-
librium state price/probability ratios will be ranked oppositely to aggregate
wealth. However, if some agents are suciently ambiguity averse the situ-
ation may be quite dierent, even if their (generalized) \beliefs" coincide.
As noted above, agents who are suciently averse to ambiguity will choose
to hold an unambiguous portfolio. If the ambiguous securities are in un-
equal total supply, this means that the remaining | less ambiguity averse
| agents must hold the imbalance of ambiguous securities. Because the rel-
ative prices of these ambiguous securities are determined by the marginal
rates of substitution of these remaining agents, this eect tends to dis-
tort state price/probability ratios; if the distortion is suciently large, state
price/probability ratios may not be ranked opposite to aggregate wealth.
This implication for rankings of state/price probabilities in turn has an
implication for representative agent pricing. If all agents maximize expected
utility with respect to a common prior (but with possibly dierent risk at-
titudes), equilibrium prices can always be rationalized by a representative
agent who maximizes expected utility with respect to that common prior.5
However, if the distortion created by the presence of ambiguity averse agents
is suciently large that state price/probability ratios are not be ranked op-
posite to aggregate wealth, equilibrium prices cannot be rationalized by a
5See Constantinides (1982), for example.
4representative agent who maximizes expected utility with respect to any
\obvious" prior | or even by a representative agent who is ambiguity averse
and who has any \obvious" beliefs.6 This would seem to have important
implications for nance, where the representative agent methodology is per-
vasive.
Our laboratory environment is ideal for studying these predictions. We
obtain a complete record of individual portfolio choices. We can manipulate
supplies of ambiguous securities so that anomalous orderings are (predicted
to be) likely in some treatments and unlikely in others. And we can compare
outcomes in a treatment where some states are ambiguous with outcomes in
a treatment which is identical in every respect except that state probabilities
are commonly known.
Our experimental data are consistent with the theoretical predictions.
The population is heterogeneous: some agents are quite ambiguity averse
and some are not. In treatments where there is no ambiguity, the cross
section of portfolio weights shows a single mode equal to the market weight;
that is, the modal investor holds the market portfolio.7 In treatments where
there is ambiguity, the mode is at equal weighting, reecting the desire of
highly ambiguity averse agents to hold ambiguous state securities in exactly
equal proportions. (In some experiments, there is a second mode at the net
market weighting.) In treatments where there is no ambiguity, the ranking of
state price/probabilities is opposite the the ranking of aggregate wealth; in
treatments where there is ambiguity, the rankings are anomalous exactly in
those treatments where theory predicts anomalous rankings are most likely.
Our nding of a mode at equal portfolio weights under ambiguity is also
interesting as it bears on a theoretical debate. The question is whether
ambiguity aversion is to be modelled in a non-smooth fashion, as we do
following Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989), or in a smooth fashion, as is done in
the aptly called \smooth ambiguity" model of Klibano, Marinacci & Mukerji
6In the text we discuss in some detail what we mean by \obvious" priors and beliefs.
7Some models | CAPM for instance | would predict that all agents should hold the
market portfolio; the data do not support that prediction.
5(2005), which is receiving increasing attention in the nance literature (see,
e.g., Izhakian & Benninga (2008)). For an agent with smooth ambiguity
preferences, equal portfolio weights are | as is the case with expected utility
maximizing agents | a knife-edge choice. So we do not think that such
agents signicantly contribute to the mode at equal weighting observed in
our experiments with ambiguity.8
One other feature of our experimental data is worth noting. In principle,
there need be no correlation between ambiguity aversion (measured by )
and risk aversion (measured by concavity of u), but our experimental data
suggests that a positive correlation may in fact obtain. If this is a property
of the population as a whole, it could have signicant eects on the pricing
of dierent kinds of assets, and presents a potential explanation of the \value
eect" | the observation that the historical average return of growth stocks
is smaller than that of value stocks, even after accounting for risk. Assuming,
as seems natural, that value stocks are more like risky securities and growth
stocks are more like ambiguous securities, heterogeneity in ambiguity aver-
sion and positive correlation between ambiguity aversion and risk aversion
would suggest that the markets for growth and value stocks should be seg-
mented, and that growth stocks should be held | and priced | primarily by
investors who are less ambiguity averse and hence (because of the presumed
correlation) less risk averse, while value stocks would be held and priced by
the market as a whole. This would suggest that growth stocks should carry a
lower risk premium and yield lower returns, while value stocks should carry a
higher risk premium and yield higher returns. As noted, this precisely what
the historical data suggest; see Fama & French (1998) for instance.9
The approach here follows Bossaerts, Plott & Zame (2007), who study en-
vironments with pure risk (i.e., known probabilities). That paper documents
that there is substantial heterogeneity in preferences but that much of this
heterogeneity washes out in the aggregate, so that the pricing predicted by
familiar theories such as CAPM obtains (approximately) even though port-
8 A similar nding is reported, in a pure choice context, by Ahn, Choi, Gale & Kariv
(2009).
9We thank Nick Barberis for this observation.
6folio separation does not. (The market portfolio is the modal holding, but
not at all the universal holding.) In the environment addressed here, with
both risk and ambiguity, heterogeneity does not wash out in the aggregate
and pricing predicted by familiar theories does not obtain.
Two recent papers provide notable complements to our work. Easley &
O'Hara (2009) also point out that the risk premium in markets populated
with investors with heterogeneous attitudes towards ambiguity will depend
on the number of investors who choose to hold aggregate risk, and goes on to
derive (theoretical) implications for regulation, assuming that risk aversion
and ambiguity aversion are uncorrelated. However, these authors provide no
experimental or historical data or empirical analysis to suggest that their
assumptions about risk aversion and ambiguity aversion or their theoretical
predictions are actually observed. Ahn, Choi, Gale & Kariv (2009) uses
experimental data to estimate the extent of ambiguity aversion in a subject
population. However, these authors work entirely in an individual choice
environment, rather than in a market environment.
The above-mentioned papers belong to an emerging literature that studies
the impact of non-expected utility preferences on prices and choices in com-
petitive markets, either theoretically or experimentally. Gneezy, Kapteyn &
Potters (2003) analyze the impact of myopic loss aversion on pricing, but as-
sumes homogeneous preferences. Kluger & Wyatt (2004) study the impact of
particular cognitive biases on updating and pricing in experimental markets,
but does not provide a theoretical framework within which it is possible to
understand the eects (if any) of heterogeneity. Chapman & Polkovnichenko
(2006) study the eects of a particular class (rank-dependent expected util-
ity) of non-expected utility preferences on asset prices and portfolio holdings,
but the preferences studied do not display ambiguity aversion in the sense
studied here and equilibrium prices always admit a representative agent ra-
tionalization. See Fehr & Tyran (2005) for an overview.
A related literature, including Epstein & Wang (1994), Uppal & Wang
(2003), Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent & Williams (2002), Maenhout (2004), Ski-
adas (2008), Trojani, Leippold & Vanini (2007), seeks to explain the equity
7premium puzzle (high average returns on equity and low average riskfree
rate) by appealing to ambiguity (which they call \Knightian" or \model"
uncertainty) on the basis of a model with an ambiguity averse representative
agent. However, we show that ambiguity aversion does not aggregate across
a heterogeneous population, so that prices may not be rationalizable by an
ambiguity averse representative agent. Hence, our nding of substantial het-
erogeneity would seem to suggest problems with this literature.
Following this Introduction, Section 2 begins by presenting the theoretical
analysis, generating predictions about choices and prices. Section 3 describes
our experimental design. Section 4 analyzes the data in view of the theoret-
ical predictions. Section 5 explores alternative explanations for the observed
patterns in prices and holdings. Section 6 concludes.
82 Theory
We treat a market that unfolds over two dates, with uncertainty about the
state of nature at the second date. In keeping with the Ellsberg experi-
ment, we refer to the three possible states of nature as Red, Green, Blue or
R;G;B.10 Trade takes place only at date 0; consumption takes place only at
date 1. There is a single consumption good.
At date 0, each of N agents are endowed with and trade a riskless asset
(cash) and Arrow securities whose payos depend on the realized state of
nature. It is convenient to denote the security by the state in which it pays;
thus the Red security pays 1 unit of consumption if the realized state is Red
and nothing in the other states, etc. Write p = (pR;pG;pB) for the vector of
prices of Arrow securities. Normalize so that the price of the riskless security
is 1; absence of arbitrage implies that pR +pG +pB = 1. Because a complete
set of Arrow securities are traded, markets for contingent claims are complete
(the riskless asset is redundant), so it is convenient to view our market as an
Arrow-Debreu market for complete contingent claims.
Agents are completely described by consumption sets, which we take to be
R3, endowments e 2 R3, and utility functions U:R3 ! R. (To be consistent
with the experimental environment described in Section 3 we allow wealth to
be negative in some states.) An agent whose endowment is e and utility
function is U and who faces prices p 2 R3
+, chooses wealth w 2 R3 to
maximize U(w) subject to the budget constraint p  w  p  e.
As usual, an equilibrium consists of prices p and individual choices wn
such that
 agent n's choice wn maximizes utility Un(wn) subject to the budget
constraint p  wn  p  en
10Obviously the choice of labels is arbitrary; we maintain the Ellsberg labeling for ease
of reference. In the experiments, we use the more neutral labeling X;Y;Z.









2.1 Individual Choice: Expected Utility
We rst recall familiar implications of the assumption of expected utility for
choice behavior.
Consider an agent who maximizes expected utility according to (objective
or subjective) priors R;G;B. By denition, this means the agent's utility
for state-dependent wealth w is
U(w) = Ru(wR) + Gu(wG) + Bu(wB)
where u is a Bernoulli utility function (for certain consumption), assumed to
be twice dierentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. Given prices
p = (pR;pG;pB) (and recalling that we allow wealth to be negative) the rst






for all states ; = R;G;B (1)
Strict concavity implies that u0 is a strictly decreasing function, so that
u0(w) < u0(w) exactly when w > w. Hence choices of state-dependent
wealth are ranked oppositely to state price/probability ratios:






for all states ; = R;G;B (2)
Note that the ranking of state-dependent wealth choices is independent of
the felicity function u and of the magnitudes of prices, but of course the
magnitude of wealth choices depends on both u and the magnitude of prices.
102.2 Individual Choice: Ambiguity Aversion
As we show, the implications of the assumption of sensitivity to ambiguity
for choice behavior may be quite dierent from those derived above.
To model preferences that are sensitive to ambiguity, we employ a gen-
eralization of Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) called the -maxmin model; see
Ghirardato, Maccheroni & Marinacci (2004) for an axiomatization and more
detailed discussion. We assume that there are a Bernoulli utility function u
(assumed to be twice dierentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave),
a convex set C of subjective priors on the state space S = (R;G;B), and

















If C is a singleton, this reduces to subjective expected utility, so the extent
to which C is not a singleton is a reection of the perceived degree of am-
biguity. The coecient  measures the degree of aversion to this perceived
ambiguity: maximal aversion to ambiguity occurs at  = 1 (corresponding to
the \maxmin" preferences of Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989)); maximal loving
of ambiguity occurs at  = 0.
In our setting, it is natural to assume that the event of a draw of a red
ball from the urn is unambiguous with given probability R, so the set C
reduces to an interval in the two dimensional unit simplex 2  R3:
C = f(R;;) 2 
2 : ; 2 [a;b];R +  +  = 1g




[u(wG) + (1   R   )u(wB)]
+ (1   ) max
2[a;b]
[u(wG) + (1   R   )u(wB)] (4)
11We interpret a = b as absence of perceived ambiguity and a = 0, b = 1   R
as maximal perceived ambiguity. When  = 1=2, the agent behaves like an
expected utility maximizer with beliefs (R;(1   R)=2;(1   R)=2), and so
appears neutral with respect to ambiguity.11
To derive optimal choice behavior, it is convenient to work indirectly. As-
sume a < b (so that the agent perceives ambiguity). Let w = (wR;wG;wB)
be the optimal choice when prices are p. We begin by analyzing the implica-
tions of choices of relative wealth in the ambiguous states. There are three
cases to consider:
 wG > wB: In this case, the minimum in the formula (4) for utility
occurs when  = a and the maximum occurs when  = b, so the
formula reduces to
U(w) = R u(wR) + au(wG) + (1   R   a)u(wB)
+ (1   )bu(wG) + (1   )(1   R   b)u(wB)
Because we allow short sales, state wealth is not constrained to be























(1   )b + a









(1   )b + a
(1   R   a) + (1   )(1   R   b)
(6)
11This is a special implication of the fact that there are only two ambiguous states of
nature.
12 wG < wB: In this case, the minimum in the formula (4) for utility
occurs when  = b and the maximum occurs when  = a, and a




b + (1   )a
(1   R   b) + (1   )(1   R   a)
(7)
 wG = wB: In this case the minimum and the maximum in (4) are
achieved for every choice of ;. Keeping the previous calculations in





a + (1   )b




b + (1   )a
(1   R   b) + (1   )(1   R   a)
We can summarize the above discussion simply as:




(1   )b + a
(1   R   a) + (1   )(1   R   b)
(8)




b + (1   )a
(1   R   b) + (1   )(1   R   a)
(9)
wG = wB () otherwise (10)
So far, we have made no assumption as to the agent's ambiguity aversion,
but we now suppose that  6= 1=2, so that the agent is not maximizing
expected utility. If  > 1=2 | that is, the agent is ambiguity averse |
then the right-hand side of (8) is strictly smaller than the right-hand side
of (9). (Note that the numerators of the right-hand sides of inequalities
(8) and (9) are convex combinations of a;b and that the denominators are
convex combinations of (1 R a);(1 R b).) Hence there is a non-empty
open set of prices p for which an agent having these preferences will choose to
hold an unambiguous portfolio | that is, a portfolio with wB = wG. Figure 1
illustrates the situation for a = 0;b = 1 R. As indicated in the gure, with
 > 1=2 for (;pG=pR) between the curves, the agent chooses wG = wB; for


































Figure 1: Optimal choices as a function of  (with a = 0 and b = 1   R)
(;pG=pR) above the top curve, the agent chooses wG < wB; for (;pG=pR)
below the bottom curve, the agent chooses wG > wB. For  closer to 1,
there is a larger range of prices for which the agent chooses an unambiguous
portfolio; in particular, if  = 1 (so the agent perceives maximal ambiguity
and is maximally averse to ambiguity) the agent chooses an unambiguous
portfolio for all possible prices.12 Note that if wG = wB is optimal | i.e., if











12If a > 0 or b < 1   R then the qualitative features of Figure 1 remain, although the
curves are closer together.
14Finally, suppose that  < 1=2, so the agent is ambiguity loving. Now
the right-hand side of (8) is strictly larger than the right-hand side of (9),
and there is an open set prices for which the agent has two solutions to her
optimum problem, one with wG > wB, and one with wG < wB (see Figure 1).
For no price ratio pG=pB it is optimal for her to hold wG = wB. Thus, an
ambiguity loving agent will never hold an unambiguous portfolio, and may
for some price ratios be indierent between a prole which pays more in state
B than in state G and a prole which does the exact opposite. See Figure 1.
2.3 Equilibrium Implications
The implications derived above for individual choice have immediate implica-
tions for equilibrium choices and hence for equilibrium prices. Throughout,
we assume WG 6= WB.
2.3.1 Homogeneous Ambiguity Attitudes
We rst address the setting in which all agents have the same attitude toward
ambiguity. It is convenient to discuss the various cases separately.
 Case 1: all agents maximize expected utility with respect to
a common prior  = (R;G;B).13 At equilibrium, all agents face
the same prices and individual choices wn sum to the social endowment
W =
P
en, so it follows from (2) that











 Case 2: Cn = C and n =  > 1=2 for all n. If C = [0;1   R] and
 = 1, there is no equilibrium with positive prices, so we exclude this
13Recall that agents who are neutral to ambiguity | i.e., for whom  = 1=2 | behave
as if they maximize expected utility with respect to the uniform prior.
15case.14 In other cases, it is easily seen that there is a unique equilibrium,
having the property that prices and choices are exactly as they would
be if all agents maximized expected utility with respect to a common
prior. If WG > WB, the imputed prior is
^  =

R; a + (1   )b; 1   R   (a + (1   )b)

while if WG < WB, the imputed prior is
~  =

R; b + (1   )a; 1   R   (b + (1   )a)

In either one of the above equilibria, we should observe all agents choos-
ing portfolios which reect the ranking of social wealth: if WG > WB
then wn
G > wn
B for each n; WG < WB then wn
G < wn
B for each n.
 Case 3: Cn = C and n =  < 1=2 for all n. Here things are
more complicated, because the optimization problem of an ambiguity
loving agent may have two solutions, one with wn
G > wn
B, and one with
wn
G < wn
B. If WG > WB, at an equilibrium some agents must settle
on the wn
G > wn
B choice but some might choose wn
G < wn
B. However,
no agent will choose wn
G = wn
B, regardless of the price ratio pG=pB.
Therefore, with common  < 1=2 in equilibrium we should observe a
group of agents whose holdings are ranked in the same direction as
the aggregate wealth ratio, but we may also observe a group of agents
whose holdings are ranked in the opposite direction from the aggregate
wealth ratio. Since preferences are not convex, though, equilibrium is
not guaranteed to exist in this case.
2.3.2 Heterogeneous Ambiguity Attitudes
We next turn to the setting in which attitudes toward ambiguity are hetero-
geneous across the population. As we shall see, equilibrium in this setting
may be much more complicated. To illustrate, we suppose there are only
14There is an equilibrium in which some price is 0.
16two types of agents: Type I agents maximize expected utility with respect to
a common prior  = (R;G;B); Type II agents perceive ambiguity (C is
not a singleton) and are ambiguity averse ( > 1=2). Write L for the set of
Type I agents and M for the set of Type II agents.15 We suppose beliefs are
consistent across the population, in the sense that  2 C. We are interested
in the situation WG 6= WB; to be denite, assume WG > WB. (Of course,
our conclusions change in the opposite way if WG < WB.)
Following our earlier discussion, we rst derive implications for the dis-
tribution of equilibrium wealth in the ambiguous states. These implications
are most easily expressed in terms of the distribution (across agents) of the
share wG=(wG + wB) of wealth in state G relative to the total of wealth in
the ambiguous states.
As (10) shows, the choices of Type II agents will depend on whether or
not the equilibrium price ratio pG=pB falls in the interval
V =

(1   )b + a
(1   R   a) + (1   )(1   R   b)
;
b + (1   )a
(1   R   b) + (1   )(1   R   a)

Notice that the interval V is increasing in C (perception of ambiguity) and
in  (aversion to ambiguity). In the limit when C = [0;1   R] and  = 1,
V = (0;1), so the equilibrium price ratio pG=pB necessarily falls into V .
If pG=pB is not in V , then Type II agents will behave like Type I agents,
and all agents will choose wealth holdings ranked in the same order as ag-
gregate wealth. Hence all agents choose wG > wB and wG=(wG+wB) > 1=2.
Moreover, there is no reason to expect qualitative dierences between Type
I and Type II agents. Note also that all agents will marginally adjust their
holdings as the price ratio pG=pB changes.
If, on the other hand, the equilibrium pG=pB is in V then the situation
15 Similar results would follow if we assumed that all agents have -maxmin preferences
with common C, and Type I agents have strictly lower  than Type II agents, as long as
equilibrium exists.
17will be quite dierent.
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That is, the distribution of wealth shares for Type I agents will be
skewed to the right of the distribution of wealth shares that would be
expected in the absence of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion.
(iii) In view of (1), choices of Type I agents are sensitive to the entire
vector p of state prices; in view of (10), (5) and (11), choices of Type
II agents are sensitive only to pR and pG + pB. Put dierently: all
18agents are marginal with respect to the determination of the price ratio
pR=(pG + pB) but only Type I agents are marginal with respect to the
determination of the price ratio pG=pB.
(iv) Type II agents choose to hold equal wealth wm
a in the ambiguous states
G;B; the magnitudes of wm
a and wealth wm
R in the risky state are
determined by the budget constraints and rst-order conditions (11).
For these agents, state-dependent wealth need not be ranked oppo-
site to the ranking of state/price probabilities. Hence the aggregate
state-dependent wealth held by Type II agents also need not be ranked
opposite to the ranking of state price/probabilities.
(v) In the aggregate, Type I agents hold the dierence between overall
aggregate wealth and the aggregate wealth held by Type II agents. Be-
cause the ranking of state-dependent wealth held by Type II agents
need not be ranked opposite to the ranking of state price/probabilities,
it follows that the ranking of state-dependent wealth held by Type I
agents need not be ranked opposite to the ranking of state price/probabilities
either. However, as discussed before, the individual rankings of state-
dependent wealth held by Type I agents should be the same as the
aggregate ranking of state-dependent wealth held by Type I agents.
What rankings are possible? With respect to the ambiguous states, the-
ory implies clear comparisons. Because WG > WB and agents of Type
II choose equal wealth in the ambiguous states G;B, W II
G = W I
B and
hence W I
G > W I
B. In view of (1), the wealth choices of Type I agents
should be ranked opposite to state price/probability ratios; because
these choices sum to W I
G and W I
B, it follows that state price/probability
ratios should be ranked opposite to social wealth: pG=G < pB=B.
However, no clear comparisons can be made with respect to the risky
state R. As the reader can verify, no matter how aggregate wealth in
the risky state WR is ranked with respect to aggregate wealth in the am-
biguous states WG;WB, any ranking of the state price/probability ratio
for the risky state pR=R with respect to the state price/probability ra-
tios for the ambiguous states pG=G;pB=B is theoretically possible.
However, not all rankings seem equally likely or plausible. For exam-
19ple, simulations of environments in which each type consists of identical
agents show that aggregate wealth rankings WG > WR > WB are less
likely to lead to \anomalous" rankings of state price/probabilities than
are aggregate wealth rankings WG > WB > WR. In the latter case. the
\anomalous" ranking pG=G < pR=R < pB=B, which has a straight-
forward economic interpretation (the relative scarcity of Arrow security
B and the high demand due to Type II agents shoots its probability-
adjusted price higher than that of security R) is quite likely.
Finally, we note an implication for representative agent pricing. If all
agents maximize expected utility with respect to a common prior (or more
generally, have common ambiguity attitude and \beliefs"), then the ranking
of state price/probabilities should be opposite to the ranking of aggregate
wealth, and prices can be rationalized by the preferences of a represen-
tative agent who maximizes expected utility with respect to the common
prior.16 However, if some agents are ambiguity averse and the ranking of
state price/probabilities is not opposite to the ranking of aggregate wealth,
prices cannot be rationalized by the preferences of a representative agent who
maximizes (state-independent) expected utility with respect to the common
prior of Type I agents. Whether prices can be rationalized by the preferences
of a representative agent with some other prior is an issue to which we shall
return in Section 5.
16See Constantinides (1982) for example.
203 Experimental Design
The following is a brief description of our experimental design and of the
parameters for each of the ten experimental sessions.
Each experimental session consisted of a sequence of eight trading peri-
ods, of xed and announced length. At the beginning of each trading period,
subjects were endowed with securities and cash. There were two endowment
proles (prole type i and prole type ii in the tables).17 During each trading
period, markets were open and subjects were free to trade securities, using
cash as the means of exchange. At the end of the trading period, markets
closed, the state of the world was revealed, and security dividends were paid.
Dividends of end-of-period holdings of securities and cash constituted a sub-
ject's period earnings, but actual payments were only made at the end of
the experiment.18 (Thus earnings in each period did not aect endowments
in future periods.) At the end of the experimental session, the cumulated
period earnings were paid out to the subject, together with a sign-up re-
ward. Though some of the subjects had participated in previous economic
experiments, no subject participated to more than one of our experiments.
Two kinds of securities, bonds and stocks, were traded. Bonds paid a
xed dividend of $0.50. Stocks paid a random dividend, depending on the
state of the world: the Red (respectively Green, Blue) security paid $0.50
if the state was revealed to be Red (respectively Green, Blue) and nothing
otherwise. Subjects were allowed to short-sell stocks and bonds, as long as
they did not take positions that could result in losses of more than $2.00.19
17In some sessions, cash and security payos were denominated in US dollars; in other
sessions, cash and security payos were denominated in a ctitious currency called francs;
at the end of the session, francs were converted to dollars at a pre-announced rate. The
results do not appear to depend on the denomination of payos.
18In some sessions, some subjects were given a loan of cash which they were required to
repay from end-of-period proceeds; in other sessions, subjects received a negative endow-
ment of bonds | a loan, in a dierent guise. Here we report loans as negative endowments
of bonds.
19In the early sessions, we imposed this limit ex post, by barring subjects with more
21Trading took place over an electronic market organized as a continuous open-
book double auction in which infra-marginal orders remained displayed until
executed or canceled.20
The state of the world was determined by a draw from an urn. At the
beginning of each session, the urn contained 18 balls, of which 6 were Red
and the others were either Green or Blue. In some sessions, subjects were
told the entire composition of the urn, so the environment was one of pure
risk; in other experiments subjects were told | a la Ellsberg | only the total
number of balls and the number of Red balls, so the environment involved
both risk and ambiguity. Balls were drawn without replacement, so both the
total number of balls in the urn and the number of balls of each color (and
hence the proportion of balls of each color) changed during the course of the
experimental sessions. In particular, in sessions in which the composition of
the urn was ambiguous, the ambiguity persisted throughout the session.
Sessions typically lasted 2.5 hours and began with two practice periods.21
Subject earnings ranged from $0 to $125, with an average of approximately
$50.
We classify experimental sessions according to the endowment distri-
bution, the urn composition, and the ambiguity/risk environment. Fol-
lowing the discussion of discussed in Subsection 2.3, we used two endow-
than $2.00 losses in a period from trading in future periods. In later sessions we employed
software that checked pending orders against a bankruptcy rule: wealth was computed
in all possible states, assuming that all orders within 20% of the best bid or ask were
executed; if losses were larger than $2.00, the pending order was rejected.
20Three dierent interfaces were used: (i) Marketscape (developed in Charles Plott's
lab), in which quantities and prices had to be entered manually; (ii) eTradeLab (developed
by Tihomir Asparouhov) in which market orders (orders that executed immediately at the
best available price) could be entered by clicking only, (iii) jMarkets (developed at Caltech,
and available as open source software at http://jmarkets.ssel.caltech.edu) in which all
orders were submitted by point-and-click. The results do not appear to depend on the
interface used.
21In some sessions subjects were paid in practice periods and in some sessions subjects
were not paid in practice periods, but in neither case are the results from practice periods
recorded in the data. The results do not appear to depend on payments in practice periods.
22ment distributions, one chosen to make reversals in the ranking of state
price/probabilities more likely (we refer to this treatment as PRR = possi-
ble/more likely rank reversals), and the other chosen to make rank reversals
less likely (NRR = no/less likely rank reversals). For each endowment dis-
tribution we conducted experimental sessions with three dierent urn com-
positions (A, B, C). Finally, for four of the sessions (corresponding to four
vectors of endowment distributions/urn compositions), we repeated the ses-
sion with dierent subjects but with the same endowment distributions, the
same urn compositions and the same sequence of draws from the urn | but
we announced the true composition of the urn. Thus, we created four sets of
paired sessions in which it is possible to compare outcomes in environments
with risk and ambiguity and environments with pure risk.22 For convenience,
we identify each of the ten experiments by the endowment distribution, urn
composition and ambiguity/risk treatment; eg., (NRR, B, Risk). For the
various sessions, Table 1 shows the security endowments for each subject
type, Table 2 shows the corresponding wealth distributions, Table 3 shows
the number of subjects of each type, and Table 4 shows the fraction of aggre-
gate wealth in each of the ambiguous states, computed from the endowments
for each subject type and the number of subjects of each type. (The numbers
shown are approximate, because they dier slightly according to the precise
number of subjects of each type.) Finally, Table 5 shows the urn composition.
Subjects were told their own endowment prole but not the endowments
of others or aggregate endowments. In particular, subjects had no way of
knowing the ranking of social wealth, and so could not distinguish between
the NRR and PRR treatments.
The Appendix contains the web instructions that subjects read before
starting an experimental session. Details of the last experimental session,
classied as (NRR,B, Risk), can be viewed on the experimental web site:
http://clef.caltech.edu/exp/amb/start.htm
22It is worth repeating that no subject was confronted with both an ambiguous urn and
a risky urn, since no subject participated to more than one experimental session.
23Table 1: Security Endowments
Experiment Prole Endowments
Type Type R G B Notes Cash
NRR i 0 28 0 0 $2.00
ii 20 12 0 -5 $1.00
PRR i 3 12 0 0 $1.20
ii 0 4 9 -4 $2.00
Table 2: Initial Wealth
Experiment Prole Wealth
Type Type R G B
NRR i $2.00 $16.00 $2.00
ii $8.50 $4.50 -$1.50
PRR i $2.70 $7.20 $1.20
ii $0.00 $2.00 $6.50
Table 3: Number of Subjects per Prole Type (i,ii)
Experiment Experiment Risk Ambiguity
Type
NRR A (15,14) (15,14)
B (15,14) (15,14)
C - (13,13)
PRR A (15,14) (13,13)
B (12,12) (12,12)
C - (15,14)
24Table 4: Aggregate Wealth Distribution in the Ambiguous States (Ap-
proximate)




Table 5: Initial Composition of Urn
Experiment Experiment Urn
Type R G B
NRR A 9 3 6
B 6 3 9
C 9 3 6
PRR A 6 6 6
B 6 6 6
C 6 6 6
254 Empirical Findings
In this Section we discuss the experimental data, rst with regard to the
cross-sections of security holdings and then with regard to state price/probability
ratios. In the last Subsection, we discuss possible correlation between risk
aversion and ambiguity aversion.
4.1 End-of-period Wealth
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the existence and eect of ambiguity aversion
is to be found in the cross-sectional distribution of end-of-period wealth. The
starkest and most striking way to see the eect is to compare end-of-period
wealth in the four paired risk/ambiguity treatments: (NRR, A, Risk) and
(NRR, A, Ambiguity); (NRR, B, Risk) and (NRR, B, Ambiguity); (PRR, A,
Risk) and (PRR, A, Ambiguity); (PRR, B, Risk) and (NRR, B, Ambiguity).
These comparisons are presented as histograms in Figures 2 and 3. In
each Figure, the top two panels provide the results for the Risk treatments
(left: conguration A; right: conguration B) and the lower panels pro-
vide the results for the corresponding Ambiguity treatments. In each of the
four Risk treatments, the observed distribution of wG=(wG+wB) (individual
wealth in the Green state as a proportion of individual wealth in the two
ambiguous states) is nearly uni-modal, and very consistent with the aggre-
gate wealth ratios WG=(WG+WB) (which are approximately :98 in the NRR
treatments and :63 in the PRR treatments; see Table 4). However, in the four
Ambiguity treatments the modes have shifted to :50, apparently reecting
choices of ambiguity averse subjects, and the distributions have signicantly
bigger right tails, reecting the compensating choices of ambiguity-tolerant
subjects. (The few observations in the left tails | below 0.5 | are not
strictly compatible with our simplied model, but they would be compatible
with a small extension that allows for ambiguity loving agents because, as we
discussed in Subsection 2.2, such agents may want to hold a portfolio with
wG < wB.)






























Figure 2: Histograms of nal wealth in state G as a proportion of nal wealth in states
G and B, NRR treatment. Top panels: pure-risk treatment (left: A; right: B); bottom
panels: corresponding ambiguity treatment.
























Figure 3: Histograms of nal wealth in state G as a proportion of nal wealth in states
G and B, PRR treatment. Top panels: pure-risk treatment (left: A; right: B); bottom
panels: corresponding ambiguity treatment.
27For the proles (NRR, C, Ambiguity) and (PRR, C, Ambiguity) we have
no corresponding paired Risk treatments. However, as Figure 4 shows, the
distributions of end-of-period wealth are entirely consistent with our hetero-
geneous ambiguity attitude model, with the mode at :50 and heavy right
tails.




















Figure 4: Histograms of nal wealth in state G as a proportion of nal wealth in states
G and B; (left: NRR treatment, right: PRR treatment).
Table 6 further describes end-of-period holdings, conrming that 0.5 is
the mode of relative holdings of ambiguous securities in each session (with
ambiguity), and listing the proportion of subjects holding exactly the mode
at the end of a period in each session. The last two rows present the second
most frequent ratio after 0.5, and the proportion of subjects holding such
ratio.23 It is apparent that the dierences in proportion are signicant.
As the discussion of equilibrium in Section 2.3 shows, these holdings data
are not compatible with any homogeneous ambiguity attitudes: if ambiguity
attitudes were homogeneous across the population (in particular, if all agents
maximized expected utility), we should not observe a signicant number of
agents holding a portfolio with wG=(wG + wB) = 1=2.
23In some (but not all) sessions, this second mode corresponded to the proportion in-
duced by the initial endowments. The small numbers of subjects holding the second mode
suggests the absence of endowment eects in our experiments.
28Table 6: Sample Mode of Relative Holdings of Ambiguous Securities,
Fraction of Subjects Holding It
NRR PRR
A B C A B C
mode 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
% subj. 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.24 0.09 0.18
2nd modea 0.59 0.83 1.00 0.30 0.64 0.67
% subj., 2nd mode 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
aMode of distribution after eliminating the above mode.
To explain further, note rst that for an agent who maximizes expected








If all agents maximize expected utility and hold common priors, this condi-
tion cannot hold for all agents because the ranking of social endowments is
WG > WB. If all agents maximize expected utility, but perhaps with dierent
priors, then (13) may hold for agents with particular priors | but it requires
a knife-edge condition on priors; hence we would not expect to observe it
for a signicant number of agents. In either case: if all agents maximized
expected utility (even with dierent priors) we would not expect to observe
histograms with a spike on the proportion 1/2.
Similarly, the discussion of Section 2.3 shows that a spike on the propor-
tion 1/2 is incompatible with homogeneous averson to ambiguity ( > 1=2).
It is also incompatible with homogeneous love of ambiguity ( < 1=2), be-
cause ambiguity loving agents should choose a proportion wG=(wG+wB) that
is either strictly above 1/2 or strictly below 1/2, but never equal to 1/2.
Heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion has additional implications. As al-
ready pointed out when discussing Figure 1, no matter how prices change,
an agent with extreme ambiguity aversion ( = 1) will choose not to be
29exposed to ambiguity, and hence, hold wG=(wG + wB) = 0:5. As ambiguity
tolerance increases, agents may continue not to be exposed to ambiguity,
but the range of prices for which this obtains shrinks. Now, across periods
in our experiments, prices did change. With changing prices, we therefore
expect variation of wG=(wG + wB) to be higher for more ambiguity-tolerant
agents. Identifying ambiguity tolerance by average exposure to ambiguity
(average deviation of wG=(wG + wB) from 0.5 across periods), we therefore
predict the variability of subjects' exposure to ambiguity (standard devi-
ation of wG=(wG + wB) across periods) to increase with average exposure
to ambiguity. Figure 5 conrms this prediction, lending further support to
heterogeneous ambiguity attitudes model.




























































Average final portfolio imbalance across ambiguous states
Figure 5: Plot of variability (standard deviation across periods) of wealth allocated
to state G as a proportion of nal wealth in states G and B (the ambiguous states),
against average deviation (across periods) of this proportion from 0.5; each observation
corresponds to one subject in one (ambiguity) experiment.
30The expected utility model of Savage (1954) would be consistent with
the ndings in Figure 5 only if subjects who happened to have beliefs in one
period that make them hold close to equal amounts of the ambiguous state
securities also changed their beliefs less, which would require more obstinate
priors. That is, explanation of Figure 5 in terms of the expected utility model
requires one to argue that precision of priors is correlated with exposure to
the ambiguous states (which, incidentally, the expected utility agents do not
perceive as ambiguous).
4.2 State Price/Probability Ratios
By denition, state price/probability ratios are the ratios of state prices to
state probabilities. In the Risk treatments, the probabilities R;G;B are
known, so state price/probability ratios are easily computed. In the Ambigu-
ity treatments, only R is known, so it is not obvious which state probabilities
to use in computing state price/probability ratios for the ambiguous states
G;B. Here we follow the simplest approach and use uniform priors over the
ambiguous states for the initial draw, updated by Bayes' Rule for subsequent
draws. (Other choices are possible, but they do not yield uniformly better
results; see Section 5 for discussion.)
We emphasize pricing results in the form of empirical cumulative dis-
tribution functions (ECDFs), for several reasons. The rst, and perhaps
most important, reason is that ECDFs provide unbiased estimates, unaf-
fected by time series considerations such as autocorrelation and conditional
heteroscedasticity, of the probability that a state price/probability ratio ex-
ceeds any given level. That is, ECDFs provide unbiased answers to questions
of the type
Is Prob(pR=R > 1) > Prob(pB=B > 1) ?
Because the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem implies that ECDFs converge uni-
formly to the true underlying distribution, focusing on ECDFs means that
questions concerning rst-order stochastic dominance such as
Is Prob(pR=R > a) > Prob(pB=B > a) for every a ?
31are meaningful. The second reason is that we have no direct knowledge of
subjects' actual attitudes towards risk and ambiguity, and so focus on ordi-
nal comparisons. Finally, because markets go through lengthy adjustments
| even in situations as simple as the present ones | many (perhaps most)
transactions take place before markets \settle." (In fact, in some experimen-
tal sessions, it is not clear that markets ever settled.)
As above, we focus on the paired Risk/Ambiguity treatments, as they
allow us to make the sharpest comparisons between the predictions of a
benchmark model with homogeneous (or nil; i.e., expected utility) ambiguity
aversion and a our model with heterogeneous ambiguity attitudes.
First, consider the NRR treatment. By construction, WG > WR > WB,
so in the Risk treatment the benchmark model predicts pB=B > pR=R >
pG=G. Moreover, as the discussion in Subsection 2.3 suggests, our model pre-
dicts that the same ordering should be most likely in the Ambiguity treatment
as well. As Figure 6 shows, this is what we see in the data. (The top panels
of Figure 6 display ECDFs for the NRR Risk treatments and the bottom
panels display ECDFs for the corresponding NRR Ambiguity experiments.)
In both cases, the state price/probability ratio for B stochastically dominates
the state price/probability ratio for R and the state price/probability ratio
for R stochastically dominates the state price/probability ratio for G.
Next, consider the PRR treatment, where by construction, WG > WB >
WR. As we have discussed in Section 2, in all the Risk treatments the bench-
mark model predicts pR=R > pB=B > pG=G. However, in the Ambiguity
treatments our model suggests that we may we may see rank reversals, likely
leading to the ordering pB=B > pR=R > pG=G. As the left panels of Fig-
ure 7 show, for the A session this is pretty much what we see in the data.
In the Risk treatment, the state price/probability ratio for R dominates the
ratio for B, which in turn dominates the ratio for G; in the Ambiguity treat-
ment the state price/probability ratios for B and R dominate the state/price
probability ratio for G and the ECDF for B is to the right of the ECDF for
R most (although not all) of the time. In the B sessions the data speak less
clearly, and in the Risk version, we see anomalous rankings: the ECDF for
































Figure 6: Empirical Distribution Functions (ECDFs) of state price/probability ratios,
NRR treatment. Top panels: pure risk treatment (left: A; right: B); bottom panels:
corresponding ambiguity treatment. Distribution with (green) arrows pointing to the
left is for state G; distribution with (blue) arrows pointing to the right is for state B;
distribution with (red) circles is for state R.
B is to the left of the ECDF for G much of the time. Such violations have
been observed before (Bossaerts & Plott, 2004) when, as happened here, an
unusual sequence of draws occurred. In this case, B was drawn four times in
six periods and G was never drawn at all. In later periods, subjects seemed
to believe (perhaps because of a belief in the \law of small numbers") that
G was much more more likely to be drawn and B was much less likely to
be drawn, driving pG up and pB down.24 In the corresponding Ambiguity
treatment, the ECDF for B is shifted upward and very close to the ECDF
24It is not clear that this kind of problem can be avoided. Of course one could exercise
some control over the sequence of draws | but then the draws would no longer be random.
































Figure 7: Empirical Distribution Functions (ECDFs) of state price/probability ratios,
PRR treatment. Top panels: pure risk treatment (left: A; right: B); bottom panels:
corresponding ambiguity treatment. Distribution with (green) arrows pointing to the
left is for state G; distribution with (blue) arrows pointing to the right is for state B;
distribution with (red) circles is for state R.
for R and the ECDF of G is to the left of the ECDF for B; the appreciation
of pB is consonant with what we would expect in the presence of ambiguity
averse subjects. The data for the nal two sessions are shown in Figure 8. In
the left panel, for which the conguration is (NRR, C, Ambiguity), we ex-
pect, and see, the rankings pB=B > pR=R > pG=G, just as if probabilities
were known or everybody was equally ambiguity averse. In the right panel,
for which the conguration is (PRR, C, Ambiguity), the predicted rankings
under homogeneous ambiguity aversion would be pR=R > pB=B > pG=G;
in the actual data the rankings appear anomalous.


























Figure 8: Empirical Distribution Functions (ECDFs) of state price/probability ratios.
Left = (NRR, C, Ambiguity); Right = (PRR, C, Ambiguity). Distribution with (green)
arrows pointing to the left is for state G; distribution with (blue) arrows pointing to the
right is for state B; distribution with (red) circles is for state R.
As we mentioned earlier, we emphasize the prices for all the transac-
tions because it is dicult | if not impossible | to assess when prices have
\settled down" during an experimental period. However, it is interesting to
consider what happens to the trade prices as the experimental session pro-
gresses; i.e., as periods go by. Table 7 reports the, per period, per experiment
(excluding the initial two practice periods) averages of two ratios:
 for the NRR treatments: the average of (pB=B)=(pR=R); averages
marked ** have signicance above 99%
 for the PRR treatments: the average of (pR=R)=(pB=B); averages
marked oo have signicance above 99%
As recalled above, under homogeneous ambiguity aversion all the ratios
in the table should be strictly greater than 1. The table shows that this did
obtain in later periods in the NRR experiments, but that the opposite |
what is likely to happen according to our model| was observed in the PRR
experiments. In those experiments, as periods progressed the ratio tended to
35Table 7: Average of (pB=B)=(pR=R) (NRR) and (pR=R)=(pB=B)
(PRR), per Period, per Experiment
Treatment Experiment Period Number
1 2 3 4 5 6
NRR A 0.96 1:27 1:61 2:02 2:47 1:88
B 1:26 1:17 1:52 1:34 1:48 1:71
C 1:19 1:49 1:50 2:25 2:61 2:97
PRR A 1:14 1:10 1:07 0:94oo 0:65oo 0:76oo
B 1.00 0.98 1.05 0.97 0:88oo 0:50oo
C 1:70 1:36 1:37 1:27 0.97 0:50oo
\settle" in favor of the ranking pB=B > pR=R. We therefore see that the
\anomalous" price rankings appear clearly in the late periods of each of the
PRR experiments, even when they are not highlighted by the ECDF plots.
Summing up, the pricing eects due to the introduction of ambiguity are
consistent with the suggestions of the theoretical analysis of Section 2: rank
changes in state price/probability ratios are observed, but only in the PRR
treatment |in which the security in shortest supply pays o in a risky, rather
than ambiguous, state of the world.
As we argued earlier, the heterogeneous ambiguity model we suggest has
the feature that a fraction of agents | those whose are ambiguity averse
| is infra-marginal for the price ratio pB=pG: they hold wm
B = wm
G for an
interval of price ratios (or perhaps for all price ratios, if they are suciently
ambiguity averse). The remaining agents, who are less ambiguity averse or
ambiguity neutral, are the only ones who are marginal for the price ratio
pB=pG. However, it is not true that the presence of the most ambiguity
averse agents does not aect the price ratio. It does not do so directly, of
course, but it does so indirectly: as the proportion of ambiguity averse agents
36grows, the imbalance in the relative supplies of ambiguous securities has to
be borne by fewer and fewer agents, who demand more attractive prices.
























































































Figure 9: The eects of ambiguity averse (i.e., who hold approximately wG = wB) agents
on pB=pG, with linear ts.
Indeed, that is precisely what we observe in our experimental data. Fig-
ure 9 shows that as the proportion of agents with close to wG = wB end-of-
period holdings in a given experimental period increases,25 the average ratio
pB=pG observed in the period increases as well, both in the NRR (left) and
in the PRR (right) treatments. The gure also reports linear ts, which are
jointly signicant at the 10% condence level.
4.3 Risk Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion
In theory, there seems to be no reason why risk aversion | in our framework,
concavity of the felicity function u | and ambiguity aversion | in our frame-
25Precisely, these are: for the NRR experiments the subjects whose end-of-period ratio
wG=(wG+wB) is within 0.1 of 0.5 (compare to market portfolio proportion, which is 0.98);
for the PRR experiments the subjects whose end-of-period ratio wG=(wG +wB) is within
0.025 of 0.5 (compare to market portfolio proportion, which is 0.63).
37work, the coecient  | should be at all correlated, but our experimental
data suggests that they may in fact be positively correlated.
To see this, we compare the range of end-of-period wealth across all states
| which is a measure of risk tolerance | with the range of end-of-period
wealth across the ambiguous states | which is a measure of ambiguity tol-
erance. Figure 10 displays the average of such ranges for all periods in all
the sessions what involved ambiguity. We observe a signicant positive cor-
relation between risk tolerance (a wide range of end-of-period wealth in all
states) and ambiguity tolerance (a wide range of end-of-period wealth in the
ambiguous states). Agents who are close to ambiguity neutrality are also
amost risk neutral.26
A signicant positive correlation between ambiguity aversion and risk
aversion implies a particular kind of market segmentation | particular kinds
of assets are held disproportionately by less risk-averse individuals | and
therefore has substantial implications for asset pricing. It suggests, for in-
stance, a novel explanation of the value eect | the observation that se-
curities in companies with high book-to-market values earn higher returns
(equivalently, carry a higher risk premium) than securities in companies with
low book-to-market values. Low book-to-market value suggests growth po-
tential, and hence greater ambiguity about future performance. Hence se-
curities with low book-to-market values should be held mostly by ambiguity
tolerant agents, while securities with high book-to-market values should be
held by a broader mix of investors. If ambiguity tolerant agents are also
more risk tolerant, then they require a lower risk premium, so the return on
securities with low book-to-market values (growth stocks) should be lower
than the return on securities with high book-to-market values (value stocks).
Correlation between ambiguity and risk aversion, and the resulting mar-
ket segmentation, might also be relevant for regulation (Easley & O'Hara,
2005).
26Our ndings are consistent with at least one study in neuroscience (Hsu et al, 2005).

























































Figure 10: Plot of dierence from 0.5 of wealth allocated to state G as a proportion of
nal wealth in states G and B (the ambiguous states), against average range of wealth
allocated across all states; all periods in all experiments with ambiguous states.
5 Discussion
There are two issues that deserve more discussion. The rst is connected
to the previously mentioned question of which prior should be used in our
Ellsberg setting to deate the observed state prices and the implications of
that choice for representative agent pricing. The second is whether a dierent
model of ambiguity aversion might be better suited for explaining our data.
As we remarked earlier, our discussion of the pricing results of our exper-
iments used a uniform initial probability over ambiguous states (with subse-
quent Bayesian updating) in the calculation of state price/probabilities. As
we have already observed, this choice seems to t well with the data for the
39NRR treatments. In particular, if all agents maximize expected utility and
Bayesian update from such a prior | or if agents entertain dierent priors,
but there is a \representative" agent with such a prior | we should observe
state price/probabilities similar to those in the data. However, in the PRR
treatments, this choice would not t the data well, especially not in the later
periods of experimental sessions.
It is true, however, that for each particular experimental session, it would
be possible to nd an ad hoc prior for which the ranking of the ratios is not
\perverse." Put dierently, for each particular experimental session, it would
be possible to nd an ad hoc prior for which pricing is consistent with the
existence of a representative agent. Indeed, it seems that data from a single
experimental session would always be consistent with existence of a repre-
sentative agent provided we choose the priors of that agent carefully enough.
What does not seem to be possible is to nd a single prior that delivers
\non-perverse" rankings for all the sessions. Based on our simulations, the
uniform prior is the one which delivers the fewest \perverse" rankings, and
therefore the most favorable to a strictly \common prior" Bayesian model.
One could conjecture that in our Ellsberg setting it would be natural to
expect agents to entertain dierent priors, and that equilbrium forces might
lead the market to behave \as if" there were a representative agent with
state-independent utility but with prior beliefs that diered across sessions
in a way that depended on how the \real" beliefs were distributed among
the agents.27 This would explain the need to use dierent deators in dier-
ent experiments. However, to be persuasive, such a conjecture would need
to answer (at least) two questions: 1) Why should the distribution of prior
beliefs display patterns which depend on experimental conditions (the aggre-
gate endowments) of which the agents are not informed? In particular, why
should the \representative" prior be the uniform prior in the NRR sessions
but dierent in the dierent PRR sessions? 2) More importantly, as discussed
earlier, a Bayesian agent will choose to have equal wealth in the ambiguous
27For an example of a representative agent theorem under heterogeneous beliefs, see
Jouini & Napp (2007).
40states (wG = wB) only in the knife-edge condition in which the subjective
state price/probability ratios of the two states are equal. It would seem to
be a remarkable coincidence to observe in every experimental session a large
group of subjects whose priors imply equal subjective state price/probability
ratios for the ambiguous states and another large group of subjects whose
priors imply quite dierent subjective state price/probability ratios for the
ambiguous states. This is especially true for the NRR esssions, in which the
social endowments WG;WB and prices pG;pB are quite far apart. However,
because agents who are ambiguity averse will choose equal wealth in the am-
biguous states for an open set of prices, this is exactly what we would expect
to see in a world in which a signicant fraction of agents are ambiguity averse
and a signicant fraction are ambiguity neutral. Thus, we think that hetero-
geneity in ambiguity attitude is the driving force behind our experimental
observations, rather than heterogeneity in beliefs.
The signicant proportion of agents holding equal wealth in the am-
biguous states is also the reason why we do not think it appropriate to
model ambiguity averse agents via the so-called \smooth ambiguity" model of
Klibano, Marinacci & Mukerji (2005). In that model, risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion have qualitatively similar implications: an ambiguity averse
agent will choose to hold equal wealths wG = wB in the ambiguous states only
for a single price ratio pG=pB, and will readjust his holdings in the ambiguous
states as soon as that ratio changes. Again, the end-of-period holdings we
observe in our data suggest that a signicant number of agents choose to
hold equal wealths in the ambiguous states for a range of price ratios; this
behavior seems more consistent with the -maxmin model we use.28
28These results have recently been conrmed by Ahn, Choi, Gale & Kariv (2009) in an
experiment on individual portfolio choice.
416 Conclusion
The most important ndings of this paper are that ambiguity aversion can
be observed in competitive markets and that ambiguity aversion matters for
portfolio choices and for prices. The predictions for portfolio choices seem
quite robust and well-supported by the experimental data; the predictions for
prices are less robust. This is a somewhat surprising state of aairs: much of
asset pricing theory claims to make sharp predictions about prices but much
less sharp predictions about portfolio choices. For a related discussion, see
Bossaerts, Plott & Zame (2007).
Our theoretical and experimental ndings are at odds with two apparently
wide-spread and often-asserted beliefs. The rst is that that prices reect an
average of the beliefs of all agents.29 In our setting, agents who are suciently
ambiguity averse choose not to be exposed to ambiguity, so their beliefs
about ambiguous states are not reected in prices. The second is that infra-
marginal agents have no eect on prices. In our setting, the ambiguity averse
infra-marginal agents do not have a direct eect on the prices of ambiguous
securities, but they do aect the amount of risk held by the ambiguity neutral
marginal agents and hence have an indirect eect on prices.
29See Hirshleifer (2001) for instance.
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The Markets Interface, jMarkets II.
 
I. THE EXPERIMENT 
1. Situation
The experiment consists of a sequence of trading sessions, referred to as periods. At the beginning of a period, you will be given a fresh supply of securities
and cash. Markets open and you are free to trade your securities. You buy securities with cash and you get cash if you sell securities.
At the end of the period, after markets close, the securities expire, after paying dividends
that will be specified below. These dividends, together with your cash balance, constitute your period earnings.
Period earnings are cumulative
across periods. At the end of the experiment, the cumulative earnings are yours to keep, in addition to a standard sign-up reward.
During the experiment, accounting is done in real dollars. 
 
2. The Securities
You will be given two types of securities, stocks and bonds. Bonds pay a fixed dividend at the end of a period, namely, $0.50. Stocks pay a random dividend. 
There are three types of stocks, referred to as X, Y and Z. Their payoff depends on the drawing from an urn, as explained later. The payoff is either $0.50 or 
nothing. When X stock pays $0.50, Y and Z stock pay nothing; when Y stock pays $0.50, X and Z stock pays nothing; when Z stock pays $0.50, X and Y stock
pay nothing. 
Experiment Instructions http://clef.caltech.edu/exp/amb/instructions.html
2 of 6 21.01.2008 16:06
You won't be able to buy stock or bonds unless you have the cash. You will be able to sell 
stock and bonds (and get cash) even if you do not own any. This is called short selling. If you sell, say, one X stock, then you get to keep the sales price, but 
$0.50 will be subtracted from your period earnings after the market closes and if the payoff on X stock is $0.50; you don't pay anything if the payoff on X is 
zero. If at the end of a period you are holding, say, -1 bonds, $0.50 will be subtracted from your period earnings.
The trading system checks your orders against bankruptcy: you will not be able to submit orders which, if executed, are likely to generate losses of more than 
$2 at the end of the period. 
 
3. How Payoffs Are Determined
There are three possible states, X, Y and Z. Stock X pays when state X occurs; stock Y pays when state Y occurs; stock Z pays when state Z occurs. 
  Stock X  Stock Y  Stock Z 
If state is X  $0.50 $0 $0
If state is Y  $0 $0.50 $0
If state is Z  $0 $0 $0.50
 
Here is how states are drawn. Imagine an urn with, say, 20 balls, 7 of which are marked X (X balls), 7 are marked Y (Y balls), and 6 are marked Z (Z balls). To 
determine the state in the first period, we draw one ball from this urn. Imagine that we draw an X ball. This will determine the payoff on the stocks: for each 
unit of stock X you're holding at the end of the period, you will receive $0.50. You will not receive anything for your holdings of stocks Y and Z. We then 
throw away this ball. That is, the X ball is not placed back in the urn. As a consequence, we draw the state for period 2 from an urn with the following 
composition: 6 X balls, 7 Y balls, and 6 Z balls. If we draw a Z ball in the second period, then the state for the third period will be drawn from an urn with the Experiment Instructions http://clef.caltech.edu/exp/amb/instructions.html
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following composition: 6 X balls, 7 Y balls, and 5 Z balls. Etc.
We draw the state at the beginning of each period. This means that the state will not depend on what you do during the period. Nobody will be told what the 
state is until the end of the period.
The initial composition of the urn is announced in the News page. 
 
II. THE MARKETS INTERFACE, jMARKETS
Once you click on the Participate link to the left, you will be asked to log into the markets, and you will be connected to the jMarkets server. After everybody 
has logged in and the experiment is launched, a markets interface like the one below will appear.
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1. Active Markets
The Active Markets
panel is renewed each period. In it, you'll see several scroll-down columns. Each column corresponds to a market in one of the securities. The security name is 
indicated on top. At the bottom, you can see whether the market is open, and if so, how long it will remain open. The time left in a period is indicated on the 
right hand side above the Active Markets panel. 
At the top of a column, you can also find your current holdings of the corresponding security. Your current cash holdings are given on the right hand side 
above the Active Markets panel. 
Each column consists of a number of price levels at which you and others enter offers to trade. Current offers to sell are indicated in red; offers to buy are 
indicated in blue. When pressing the Center
button on top of a column, you will be positioned halfway between the best offer to buy (i.e., the highest price at which somebody offers to buy) and the best 
offer to sell (i.e., the lowest price that anybody offers to sell at). 
When you move your cursor
to a particular price level box, you get specifics about the available offers. On top, at the left hand side, you'll see the number of units requested for purchase. 
Each time you click on it, you send an order to buy one unit yourself. On top, at the right hand side, the number of units offered for sale is given. You send an 
order to sell one unit each time you yourself click on it. At the bottom, you'll see how many units you offered. (Your offers are also listed under Current 
Orders to the right of the Active Markets panel.) Each time you hit cancel, you reduce your offer by one unit. 
If you click on the price level, a small window appears that allows you to offer multiple units to buy or to sell, or to cancel offers for multiple units at once. 
2. History
The History panel shows a chart of past transaction prices for each of the securities. Like the Active Markets panel, it refreshes every period. 
3. Current Orders 
The Current Orders
panel lists your offers. If you click on one of them, the corresponding price level box in the Active Markets panel is highlighted so that you can easily modify 
the offer.
4. Earnings History
The Earnings History table shows, for each period, your final holdings for each of the securities (and cash), as well as the resulting period earnings.
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5. How Trade Takes Place 
Whenever you enter an offer to sell at a price below or equal to that of the best available buy order, a sale takes place. You receive the price of the buy order in 
cash. Whenever you enter an offer to buy at a price above or equal to that of the best available sell order, a purchase takes place. You will be charged the price 
of the sell order.
The system imposes strict price-time priority: buy orders at high prices will be executed first; if there are several buy orders at the same price level, the oldest 
orders will be executed first. Analogously, sell orders at low prices will be executed first, and if there are several sell orders at a given price level, the oldest 
ones will be executed first. 
6. Restrictions On Offers
Before you send in an offer, jMarkets will check two things: the cash constraint, and the bankruptcy constraint. 
The cash constraint concerns whether you have enough cash to buy securities. 
If you send in an offer to buy, you need to have enough cash. To allow you to trade fast, jMarkets 
has an automatic cancelation feature. When you submit a buy order that violates the cash constraint, the system will automatically attempt to cancel buy orders 
you may have at lower prices, until the cash constraint is satisfied and your new order can be placed. 
The bankruptcy constraint concerns your ability to deliver on promises that you implicitly make by trading securities. We may not allow you to trade to 
holdings that generate losses in some state(s). A message appears if that is the case and your order will not go through. 
 
Good Luck!